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Abstract: In this paper, we adopt a cross-country perspective to analyze the short term 
effects of currency, banking and debt crises on poverty. We employ multivariate fixed 
effects panel data analysis in order to examine whether and to what extent different types 
of financial crises impact the poverty headcount ratio and the poverty gap (as measured 
by the World Bank). Our findings suggest that out of the three categories of financial 
crises we identify, it is currency crises that most significantly exacerbate both the 
incidence and depth of poverty in the short run. We find evidence that banking crises are 
associated with an increase in the depth of poverty but not the incidence (however this 
effect tends to be short-lived), while, our analysis shows no direct effect of sovereign 
debt crises on short term poverty.   
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1. Introduction  
 
The current global financial crisis, which has evolved into a global financial and 
economic crisis, is another reminder of the effect of financial (and economic) crises on 
poverty. According to a recent World Bank publication released around its annual spring 
meetings (World Bank (2009)), this crisis will push some 35 million more people in the 
Europe and Central Asia region below the poverty line. Needless to say, the current 
financial crisis has renewed the interest among researchers for further exploring the 
relationship between financial crises and poverty and for unearthing the links and the 
channels through which the two variables are connected. In this spirit, this paper 
empirically estimates the relationship between financial crises (disaggregated over 
banking, currency and debt crises) and poverty in the developing world.  
 
The paper adds to the existing knowledge in the area of financial crises and poverty in a 
few crucially important ways. Firstly, it uses a comprehensive panel dataset on 90 low 
and middle income countries to estimate the aggregate impact of financial crises on 
poverty. While doing so, it employs a new and improved measure of financial crises, 
disaggregated over banking, currency and debt crises. In particular, our paper is distinct 
from most of the available cross-country studies that deal with the impact of financial 
crises on selected macroeconomic variables, as they tend to use the term financial crises 
as a synonym for a currency crisis (Baldacci et al. (2002)) or as a synonym for a banking 
crisis (Cecchetti et al. (2009))i. In contrast, our paper represents the first attempt to 
comprehensively estimate the impact of disaggregated financial crises on poverty while 
giving equal weights to the banking, currency and sovereign debt crises.  
 
Our central findings, while confirming the existing theoretical and empirical knowledge 
that aggregate financial crises are bad for the poor, outline three important subtleties. 
First, we find that currency crises are always associated with short-run increases in the 
depth and incidence of poverty and that the effect on the incidence of poverty tends to be 
longer lived. Second, in contrast, banking crises tend to be associated only with 
exacerbating the short-run depth of poverty. Third, we find that debt crises do not impact 
upon poverty, a result which needs to be interpreted with care, given the low number of 
debt crises episodes in our sample.  
 
However, any cross-country study of this nature comes with caveats attached. First, 
poverty is experienced at the level of the individual. Additionally, cross country studies 
of poverty throw up myriad data, survey and measurement complications, including 
issues of income versus consumption, in-kind income, informal income, equivalence 
scales, regional price variations and so on. Thus, although micro data can shed more light 
on individual transmission mechanisms, the cross-country approach is not without its 
own advantages. By analyzing over a longer time period, purging the country-specific 
effects and by focusing on within-group variation, a cross country study can reveal much 
about the general forces linking macro events, such as financial crises, and poverty. In 
exploring these links our specifications are robust to the inclusion of additional 
macroeconomic variables as well as to a range of lags of the independent variables. 
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As mentioned above, so far, there have been only a few cross-country studies that deal 
with the impact of financial crises on poverty. Baldacci et al. (2002) estimate the effect of 
currency crises on poverty for a selected sample of emerging economies. While noting 
their small sample size as an important caveat they find that financial crises are bad for 
poverty and income inequality. Cline (2002) also makes an attempt to estimate the effects 
of the financial crises (mainly currency and balance of payments crises) that happened in 
the 1990s. Although his study is limited to only eight emerging market economies, he 
finds that the crises were significantly damaging to the poor. However, the impact of the 
crisis on levels of poverty was different depending on how a particular country dealt with 
the problem at hand. What emerges from this fledgling research is a consensus that, 
inevitably, crises matter for aggregate welfare and yet, constrained by data availability 
and quality, a comprehensive and systematic study of the aggregate relationship between 
the two variables remains elusive. 
 
Our paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we account for the main macro channels 
through which financial crises affect poverty, while in section 3 we take stock of the 
empirical literature that has been focused on examining the links between the two 
variables. In section 4 we present the data as well as some basic stylized facts, while 
section 5 contains the econometric methodology, results, and discussion and robustness 
checks. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. How financial crises impact on poverty 
 
Slump in economic activity 
 
A slump in economic activity is the main indirect channel through which financial crises 
may impact upon poverty. Most of the extant research (Ravallion (2001), Cline (2002)), 
has been focused on determining the “poverty elasticity” of growth, i.e. to what extent 
incomes of the poor people rise with growth (and to what extent they fall with 
contraction), finding that for every one percent increase in the mean income, the 
percentage of people living in absolute poverty decreases by 2.5 percentii. We do argue, 
however, that financial crises have an additional and independent impact on levels and 
depth of poverty – something that we explore at the end of this sectioniii.  
 
Decrease in earnings and labour market implications 
 
An occurrence of a financial crisis puts pressures on informal sector workers and changes 
the sectoral composition of employment, which in turn may exacerbate poverty levels. 
Financial crises lead to a fall in earnings of both formal and informal sector workers due 
to job losses in the formal sector and reduced demand for services in the informal sector. 
It has been previously shown that the entry of unemployed formal-sector workers into the 
informal sector puts additional pressure on the informal labour market, resulting with an 
increase in levels of poverty (Bourguignon and Morrisson (1992), Morley (1995), Walton 
and Manuyelan (1998), Lustig and Walton (1998)). 
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In addition, an occurrence of financial crises increases levels of unemployment and 
decreases real wages. Fallon and Lucas (2002), for example, cited the example of 
worsening unemployment in Korea following the Asian crisis. More importantly, 
however, the effects of the crisis were effectuated through decrease of wages rather than 
changes in the levels of employment. For example, in Indonesia and Turkey, inflation 
dramatically undermined manufacturing wages: real wages fell 44 percent in Indonesia 
and 31 percent in Turkey in a single year. In Malaysia, real wages declined only slightly 
in 1998 but the effect was intensified because the decline followed a period of high real 
wage growth. 
 
Relative price change 
 
After currency depreciation, the price of tradables (relative to non-tradables) rises, 
leading to a fall in earnings for those employed in the non-tradables sector. At the same 
time, there may be an increase in the demand for exports and consequently, employment 
and earning in the sectors producing exportables increase, thereby offsetting some of the 
losses due to the decline in GDP. Furthermore, the exchange rate may influence the price 
of imported food, increasing domestic food prices. This increase, in turn, hurts poor 
individuals and households that are net consumers of food (Baldacci et al. (2002)). 
 
In general, currency and debt crises are associated with hyperinflation, which has been 
shown numerous times to hurt the poor much more than the middle or the upper classes 
(Easterly and Fischer (2000)). As poor people spend most of their incomes on 
consumption, surging prices hurt their budgets thus forcing them to spend more money 
on consumption or to curtail their consumption patterns. Evidence from other contexts 
indicates that the poor may be less able to smooth consumption (Fallon and Lucas 
(2002)), resulting in declines in consumption with repercussions on long-term nutrition 
and health. 
 
Financial channel  
 
Financial crises could also impact upon poverty through the financial channel. According 
to Agenor (2002), the poor often lack the means to protect themselves from adverse 
income and employment shocks. They lack assets, such as bank deposits and land, and 
often have no direct access to credit markets (or face prohibitive borrowing costs when 
they do), to smooth the impact of these shocks (Fallon and Lucas (2002), Morduch 
(1995)). For those near the poverty threshold, borrowing to smooth consumption 
becomes even more expensive due to rising interest rates (Cecchetti et al (2009)). In these 
conditions, many families turn to less formal sources for borrowing funds, though there is 
little evidence on the impact of crises on such borrowing. A recent survey found that 
deposits to microfinance institutions continued to rise during the East Asian crisis, 
possibly because they were sounder institutions and rural savers were shifting out of 
smaller rural banks (Atinc and Walton (1999)). This could imply easier access to credit 
from such sources during a crisis, though recent evidence raises serious questions about 
whether microcredit institutions actually lend to poorer households (Rai, Topa and Amin 
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(1999)). Up to date, however, microcredit has played a limited role and there is a lack of 
sufficient cross-country data to check hypotheses related to it.  
 
Fiscal retrenchment and spending on health, social services and education  
 
Spending cuts affect the volume of publicly provided critical social services, including 
social assistance outlays, and limit the access of the poor to these services at a time when 
their incomes are declining (Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999)). Agenor (2002) argues that 
indirect sources of income and public transfers may decline during crises because during 
such episodes the ability of relatives or communities to engage in income redistribution 
may be reduced and government may be forced to drastically adjust their fiscal account 
with across-the-board cuts in expenditure. The public expenditure fell in absolute terms 
during the Asian crisis. In Thailand, for example, the long-term implications of health 
spending cuts for the AIDS epidemic raised concerns (Lucas and Fallon (2002)). In 
Mexico, public spending on health and labour declined 11.6 percent in real terms in 1995 
and by a further 5 percent in 1996, though these cuts were less deep than overall cuts in 
social spending (Lustig (2000)). 
 
Although the public spending in most of the countries in crises fell, they still kept some 
sizeable level of social safety nets in order to shelter the poor. In Mexico, the government 
shifted resources out of other anti-poverty programs to a short-term employment program 
in 1995, creating an estimated half a million jobs. Some 70 percent of these jobs were in 
rural areas and paid about 80 percent of the minimum wage (Lustig (2000)). Similar 
social safety nets were introduced in other Latin American countries (Argentina and 
Ecuador), as well as in Russia during the financial crisis from 1998.  
 
How different financial crises impact the levels of poverty 
 
Banking crises are expected to be associated with increases in the incidence and depth of 
poverty. As indicated by Baldacci et al. (2002), banking crises erode savings and deposits 
and are associated with changes in assets and real estate prices as well as changes in 
interest rates. In certain instances, banking crises put further strain on the financial 
system and on the ability of poor people to borrow money for the purpose of 
consumption smoothing (Lucas and Fallon (2002)). However, given that most poor 
people are on the fringes of the banking systems (and are sometimes sheltered by 
microcredit institutions during periods of crises), the direct impact of the banking crises 
should be limited in magnitude.  
 
Currency crises are also expected to increase the depth and incidence of poverty. Almost 
all currency crises are accompanied by relative price changes (especially of food), which 
as argued above, hurts the poor disproportionately more than the rich. Currency crises are 
also accompanied by a slowdown in economic activity and with pressures on the labour 
markets that further exacerbate the conditions of the poor (Baldacci et al. (2002)).   
 
Given the incidence of occurrence, we argue that debt crises do not have a direct impact 
on poverty. However, sovereign debt crises are expected to increase levels of poverty 
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indirectly via some of the channels suggested below (for example, a debt crisis could 
force a government to curtail its public spending)iv. In some cases, however, a debt 
default could free up some additional funds that could be targeted towards helping the 
poor especially in the periods of crisis (Cecchetti et al. (2009)), thus acting in opposite 
direction to some of the other financial crises.     
 
3. The Empirical literature  
 
Individual country studies 
 
Most of the empirical evidence on the impact of financial crises on poverty emerges from 
country level studies. In the case of Indonesia, Suryahadi and Sumarto (2003) evidence 
that poverty after the crisis rose by about 70 percent, mainly driven by the increase in the 
poverty gap. Particular increases were registered among the chronic poor, who suffered 
from increasing vulnerability to poverty. As a result, the proportion of the total 
vulnerable group jumped from less than one-fifth of the population before the crisis to 
more than one-third after the crisis (Said and Widyanti (2002)). Zin (2002) analyzed the 
impact of the financial crisis on poverty and inequality in Malaysia and as in previous 
studies evidenced that rural households were hurt less than urban ones. However, the 
process of recovery of urban households was smoother than that of rural ones. Natenuj 
(2002) presents a similar account of the impact of the Asian financial crisis on poverty 
and inequality in Thailand. She argues that, as the economy slid into recession, most of 
the benefits achieved in the previous decade were washed away, with serious 
repercussions on the poor. As in the case of other Asian countries, the ultra poor were 
hurt the most during the crisis. Similar widening of poverty rates was registered in China 
(Chen and Wang (2002)).  
 
World Bank’s rich database on poverty assessment studies proves useful when studying 
the impact of the financial crises on poverty rates in Latin America. The 2002 crisis in 
Argentina increased poverty rates from 37 to 58 percent. In addition, the income 
distribution worsened suggesting that lower socio-economic strata suffered more than the 
rest of the population (World Bank (2003)). In Ecuador, in addition to increase in 
poverty, worsening of the health and education outcomes was also reported. Both 
governments responded with significant increases in the social safety nets. The Argentine 
government mitigated the effect of the crisis by introducing the Bonos Jefes (which 
helped the public sector employees who lost their jobs due to the crisis). Similarly, the 
Ecuadorian government introduced Bono Solidario in order to compensate those who 
were hit by the crisis (World Bank (2000)).   
 
Lokshin and Ravallion (2000), examining the welfare effects of the 1998 financial crisis 
in Russia, find that it was not felt only by those poor prior to 1998 but impacted upon 
individuals across the income distribution. According to them, the welfare effects were 
“on balance, poverty reducing”, driven largely by effective welfare targeting. Offering a 
counter-view, Lokshin and Yemtsov (2004) argue that the formal social safety net was of 
little value for most Russians. Skoufias (2003) focuses more on the ways in which 
individual families coped with the crises and he finds that certain attitudes such as 
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reduction of non-food expenditure acted as complements to the standard insurance 
strategies. Abridging the studies above Gerry and Li (2008) report that married 
individuals living in small households, with educated heads in urban environment, 
weathered the crisis better. Similarly to Lokshin and Yemtsov (2004) they find that 
outside of pension payments, the formal social safety net did facilitate consumption 
smoothing, thus heightening the importance of informal coping institutions, principally in 
the form of increased home production.  
 
Cross – country studies 
 
The availability of cross country studies that analyze the impact of crises on poverty is 
limited. To the best of our knowledge, there is currently one study by Baldacci et al. 
(2002) that analyzes the impact of financial crises on poverty and inequality. The general 
finding of the study is that the financial crises increased the incidence of poverty and 
inequality in their sample of emerging countries. The authors however, attach two caveats 
to their paper: (i) limited number of countries (as they focus on a handful of emerging 
economies); and (ii) low number of data points which drives the magnitude and 
significance of coefficients.  
 
4. Data and stylized facts 
 
Data 
 
Data on poverty comes from the World Development Indicators. We use four measures 
of poverty: poverty headcount ratio at 1.25 USD a day, poverty gap at 1.25 USD a day, 
poverty headcount ratio at 2 USD a day and poverty gap at 2 USD a dayv. Data on 
banking, currency and debt crisis comes from Laeven and Valencia (2008), which 
consists of three dummy variables which take value of 1 for the year when a crisis 
happens and 0 otherwise. A more detailed description of the data is provided in Appendix 
1. 
 
When we define the crises, it is important to note that this is the first attempt to analyze 
the disaggregated individual effects of financial crises on the level and depth of poverty. 
Previous studies have used the term financial crisis as a synonym for banking crisis 
(Cecchetti et al. (2009)) or as a synonym for currency crisis (Baldacci et al. (2002)). 
 
Basic stylized facts  
 
A sense of the basic relationship between the financial crises and poverty variables could 
be gauged from the table below. The following few observations could be discerned: (i) 
all poverty indicators jumped by at least couple of percentage points following a currency 
crisis; (ii) poverty indicators increased following a debt crisis; (iii) the observations are 
mixed vis-à-vis the banking crises – while the relative poverty headcount ratio jumped by 
one percentage point, the absolute poverty headcount ratio and the poverty gap measures 
dropped.  
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Number of crises Poverty headcount 
ratio at 1. 25 USD a 
day, t-1
Poverty headcount 
ratio at 1. 25 USD a 
day, t+1
Poverty gap at 
1.25 USD a day, t-
1
Poverty gap at 
1.25 USD a day, 
t+1
Banking Crisis 44 22.71 20.93 10.33 7.81
Currency Crisis 40 15.40 17.86 6.18 6.69
Debt Crisis 13 7.81 7.62 2.27 2.80
Poverty headcount 
ratio at 2 USD a day, t-
1
Poverty headcount 
ratio at 2 USD a 
day, t+1
Poverty gap at 2 
USD a day, t-1
Poverty gap at 2 
USD a day, t+1
Banking Crisis 44 34.68 35.52 17.04 15.50
Currency Crisis 40 27.04 31.36 11.71 13.36
Debt Crisis 13 17.10 19.37 5.95 6.22
Source: World Development Indicators and Laeven and Valencia (2008)
Table 1. Aggregate measures of poverty before, at onset and after a specific financial crisis
 
 
Similar conclusions could be drawn from the panel charts below. Whenever a financial 
crisis occurs in a situation where the poverty levels are stable (like in Argentina for 
example), the poverty measure jumps up, while when a financial crisis strikes where a 
poverty is on a downward trend (like in the case of Brazil or Mexico), the measure of 
poverty increases.  
 
5. Econometric modelling, results and robustness checks 
 
Given that a solid and sound theoretical model in the area of financial crises and poverty 
is lacking, following Cecchetti et al (2009), we argue that the best way to empirically 
capture the impact of financial crises on poverty involves culling from the literature the 
most commonly used control variables in other poverty related empirical studies. When 
selecting the control variables, we also considered to control for the additional 
transmission channels that we enumerated above (change in relative price, government 
spending and levels of GDP per capita). In addition, we control for openness and 
institutional quality.  
 
In order to gauge the impact of financial crises on poverty, we estimate the following 
empirical modelvi: 
 
POVERTY MEASURE i,t= α + βCRISIS VARIABLE i,t + γCRISIS VARIABLE i,t-1 + 
δCRISIS VARIABLE i,t-2 + ζX i,t + error term 
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POVERTY MEASURE is the dependent variable, while CRISIS VARIABLE, and a 
vector of control variables X, are the independent variables. The vector of control 
variables encompasses: economic development (captured by the log of GDP per capita)vii, 
the level of institutional development (using Polity IV), the level of trade openness (using 
the ratio of total trade to GDP), as well as inflation and government spendingviii. The 
dataset consists of yearly data for 90 countries spanning the period between 1970 and 
2007ix. We also thought about including the informal sector economy in the estimations 
however this strategy ran into a few problems: (i) data on informal sector economy is 
available only from mid 1990s onwards; (ii) the within-country variability is low, which 
would have produced insignificant results; (iii) in light of our labour market transmission 
channel it is not convincing to argue the impact of the financial crisis would have been 
lower in countries with sizeable informal sector. We also considered controlling for the 
mitigation impact of social safety nets. Unfortunately, the social safety nets in terms of 
design and target vary from a country to a country, which renders it difficult to use them 
in a cross-country regression. A cross-country dataset on types, effectiveness and 
ultimately, coverage, of social safety nets is still lacking.  
 
We estimate the model using fixed effects. There are a few reasons for using fixed 
effects. First and foremost, due to data availability (and gaps in the poverty data in 
particular) estimating the effect of crises on cross country changes in poverty becomes a 
difficult task. Hence, estimating the impact of financial crises on levels of poverty, while 
controlling for other changes, seems a better approach. In addition, we assume a 
correlation between some of the independent variables and the time-invariant portion of 
the error term, which would render the OLS estimates inconsistent. Thus, fixed effects on 
panel data allow us to remove the above-mentioned form of endogeneity while providing 
consistent estimates for other mildly endogenous time-varying variables. Unfortunately, 
fixed effects do not permit us to control for important time invariant effects (such as for 
example initial conditions) which is one of the caveats that we attach to our findings. 
Also, most of the studies dealing with panel data take into account a possible reverse 
causality or endogeneity of the regressors and regressands. However, we argue that 
poverty does not have a significant impact on the possibility of a financial crisis 
occurring – indeed, as evidenced from our empirical examples above, financial crises 
happen in different types of countries across the board – low, lower middle and upper 
middle income countries (all of them with different levels of poverty gap and poverty 
headcount ratio). This latter point is emphasized in some of the latest empirical research 
(Cecchetti et al. (2009)). In that respect, our choice of estimation method becomes clear.  
 
A snapshot of the main summary of the data used in this study is provided in the table 
below. 
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Variable Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Poverty headcount ratio at 1.25 USD a day 417 20.76 23.19 2.00 88.52
Poverty gap at 1.25 USD a day 417 7.99 11.14 0.50 56.96
Poverty headcount ratio at 2 USD a day 417 34.30 29.17 2.00 96.56
Poverty gap at 2 USD a day 417 15.57 16.69 0.50 68.36
Banking crisis 417 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
Currency crisis 417 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
Debt crisis 417 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00
Log of GDP per capita PPP 417 8.22 0.92 5.78 10.02
Openness 417 73.93 39.10 13.64 210.37
Polity2 417 2.51 12.29 -88.00 10.00
Inflation 417 63.19 413.24 -4.48 7481.68
Government expenditure 417 13.93 4.92 2.98 31.82
Table 2 - Summary of Observations
 
 
Correlations 
 
Correlations between data are presented in Table 2. Banking and debt crises are 
negatively correlated with some of the poverty variables. Currency crises are consistently 
positively correlated with all of the poverty variables. In addition, Table 3 provides 
simple correlations of demeaned variables where similar conclusions emerge. Both tables 
suggest some behavioural patterns that we explore more closely in the next section. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Table 5 below presents our results when using the poverty headcount ratio at 1.25 USD a 
day as the dependent variable. When estimating the effect of different financial crises on 
poverty we proceed in the following way: the first three models use only one type of 
financial crisis at a time; models 4, 5 and 6 use pairs of two crises, while model 7 uses all 
three types of financial crises. In order to capture lagged effects of the crises on poverty 
we employ first and second lags as wellx.  
 
We first observe that only the currency crises and only the contemporaneous values 
appear positive and significant. In view of the results, an occurrence of currency crisis is 
associated with an increase in the poverty headcount ratio by 4 percent. We would have 
also expected some impact of the banking crises on the poverty headcount ratio (i.e. we 
would have expected to see some percentage of the people that teeter around the poverty 
line to be sliding towards poverty as a banking crisis occurs). This however depends on 
many factors, such as for example, the availability of banking accounts for the citizens of 
the lower classes and how well they are protected (and inversely how badly they are hit) 
during a period of crisis, the extent to which these people use banking services etc. It 
could also be speculated that many of the vulnerable people may be sheltered by some of 
the microcredit institutions. However, given the scope of our study as well as the data we 
use, some of these questions cannot be answered.  
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Poverty gap 
at 1.25 USD 
a day
Poverty 
headcount 
ratio at 1.25 
Poverty 
headcount 
ratio at 2 
Poverty gap 
at 2 USD a 
day
Banking 
crisis
Currency 
crisis
Sovereign 
debt crisis
Trade 
openness Polity IV
GDP per 
capita (ppp) Inflation
Government 
expenditure
Poverty gap at 1.25 USD a day 1.000
Poverty headcount ratio at 1.25 USD a day 0.956 1.000
Poverty headcount ratio at 2 USD a day 0.864 0.962 1.000
Poverty gap at 2 USD a day 0.967 0.997 0.963 1.000
Banking crisis 0.025 -0.014 -0.024 -0.003 1.000
Currency crisis 0.104 0.088 0.076 0.092 0.014 1.000
Sovereign debt crisis -0.024 -0.019 -0.008 -0.017 0.108 0.208 1.000
Trade openness -0.214 -0.266 -0.283 -0.261 0.045 -0.083 0.034 1.000
Polity IV -0.148 -0.185 -0.201 -0.180 -0.009 0.024 0.026 0.086 1.000
GDP per capita (ppp) -0.766 -0.854 -0.900 -0.857 0.028 -0.058 0.015 0.189 0.402 1.000
Inflation 0.051 0.014 -0.009 0.022 0.079 0.191 0.064 -0.156 0.026 0.009 1.000
Government expenditure -0.052 -0.117 -0.188 -0.120 0.028 -0.005 -0.008 0.226 -0.040 0.163 -0.052 1.000
Table 3 - Correlation table for the variables used in the model
 
 
Poverty 
Gap at 
1.25 USD 
a day
Poverty 
ratio at 
1.25 USD 
a day
Poverty 
ratio at 2 
USD a 
day
Poverty 
Gap at 2 
USD a 
day
Banking 
crisis 
dummy
Currency 
crisis 
dummy
Debt crisis 
dummy
GDP per 
capita 
(PPP)
Trade 
Openness Polity
Governme
nt 
Expenditur
e Inflation
Poverty Gap at 1.25 USD a day 1.000000
Poverty ratio at 1.25 USD a day 0.955800 1.000000
Poverty ratio at 2 USD a day 0.863000 0.962100 1.000000
Poverty Gap at 2 USD a day 0.966900 0.996500 0.962200 1.000000
Banking crisis dummy 0.027600 -0.012500 -0.023700 -0.001100 1.000000
Currency crisis dummy 0.102500 0.086400 0.074400 0.091300 0.016000 1.000000
Debt crisis dummy -0.024500 -0.019500 -0.008500 -0.018000 0.112800 0.207800 1.000000
GDP per capita (PPP) -0.589800 -0.680500 -0.773600 -0.694800 0.019600 -0.062700 -0.010900 1.000000
Trade Openness -0.219800 -0.271500 -0.287300 -0.265700 0.064200 -0.087900 0.032800 0.167400 1.000000
Polity -0.145800 -0.183300 -0.199100 -0.177500 -0.014500 0.024700 0.026500 0.193000 0.090000 1.000000
Government Expenditure -0.057000 -0.127400 -0.200800 -0.129200 0.011900 -0.001500 -0.012800 0.190000 0.235200 -0.041300 1.000000
Inflation -0.036800 -0.056500 -0.065600 -0.052400 0.054000 0.173300 0.031600 0.066400 -0.103300 0.030700 0.035000 1.000000
Table 4. Correlation table between the main variables used in the model (demenaed)
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Table 6 gives the results of our specifications when using the poverty gap at 1.25 USD a 
day as a measure of poverty. The estimation strategy here is the same as in Table 5. There 
are two main conclusions that could be drawn vis-à-vis the banking crisis dummy 
variable. First, when analyzing the cumulative effect of the banking crises on the 
incidence of poverty, we could see that the overall effect is positive, though it diminishes 
over time. Second, the impact of banking crises upon poverty incidence is ephemeral, i.e. 
while banking crisis is associated with increases in poverty depth contemporaneously, its 
first lag is associated with decreases in poverty. Given that most poor people are on the 
fringes of the banking systems in most developing countries (and hence take up only a 
small percentage of the financial sector), this result does not come as a surprise. 
   
The currency crisis dummy is also positive and significant, and with a magnitude which 
is much higher than the magnitude of the banking crisis variable. Currency crises 
however appear positive and significant only contemporaneously. As indicated in our 
transmission channels section, currency crises are almost always associated with a 
downturn of economic activity as well as relative price changes, which invariably hurt the 
poor, hence pushing them further down below the poverty line.  
 
The debt crises dummy appears insignificant across all specifications. The results suggest 
that sovereign debt default crises may not affect the welfare of the existing poor as much 
as the banking or the currency crises. Even though, they may trigger additional banking 
or currency crises, they in themselves are not associated with significant changes in the 
levels of poverty. Our result in a way is similar to the one obtained by Cecchetti et al 
(2009) who find that debt crises do not matter for the slowdown of economic activity as 
much as banking and currency crises do. Finally, one has to be careful when interpreting 
the effect of the debt crises as the result could be driven by the low number of debt crisis 
episodes in our sample. 
 
The control variables appear to comply with the existing knowledge in the area of 
poverty research. Trade openness is associated with lower levels of poverty, as previously 
confirmed by many studies such as the one by Dollar and Kraay (2001). In addition, our 
findings regarding democracy confirm the findings by Ross (2006). Unsurprisingly, 
higher levels of development are associated with a lower depth of povertyxi. The 
variables that capture the two additional transmission channels (inflation and government 
spending) appear insignificant.  
 
The results that we have obtained when using relative measures of poverty as dependent 
variables (poverty headcount ratio at 2 USD a day and poverty gap at 2 USD a day) are 
quite similar (in terms of significance and magnitude) to the results obtained when using 
the measures of absolute poverty. Table 7 gives the results when using the poverty 
headcount ratio at 2 USD as a dependent variable. As in the case of using the poverty 
headcount ratio at 1.25 USD a day, here as well, only the currency crisis dummy is 
positive and significant. In addition, the variable is significant in its first lag as well, 
suggesting that the effect of the currency crisis is not only immediate but could also be 
felt for some time after the beginning of the crisis. We would have expected the banking 
 
 
 14
crises to have a more pronounced impact on the levels of poverty, however, again most of 
the poor (even in relative terms) are on the fringes of the financial systems in most 
developing countries and hence, a banking crisis could not impact much upon their 
situation. 
 
Finally, table 8 summarizes the results when using the poverty gap at 2 USD a day as a 
dependent variable. As in the case when using the poverty gap at 1.25 USD a day, 
banking crisis is contemporaneously positive and significant (albeit at 10 percent level of 
significance). The magnitude of the banking crises however is smaller (and it also 
decreases with time), which confirms our previous finding – i.e. that banking crises 
matter less for poverty than currency crises and that their impact over time decreases. The 
results regarding the currency crises are somewhat different. Here, we can observe that 
the effect of currency crises is bigger than that of banking crises and lasts longer. To 
summarise, there are five key findings that stem from this first attempt to measure the 
cross-country impact of disaggregated financial crises on poverty: 
 
(i) currency crises are associated with higher levels of poverty as well as higher 
depth of poverty (which for some measures of poverty could also be felt for 
some time after the beginning of the crisis). 
(ii) Banking crises are associated with higher depth of poverty but they do not 
seem to matter for the incidence of poverty; 
(iii) Banking crises, to the extent that they are significant at all, tend to be rather 
ephemeral in nature (i.e. their effect diminishes over time). 
(iv) Debt crises are not associated with any changes in poverty.  
(v) Results i-iv are robust to the inclusion of standard control variables (level of 
development, trade openness, institutional development, inflation and 
government spending) which in turn produce estimates consistent with the 
literature. 
 
Robustness checks 
 
In order to confirm our finding that different types of financial crises have an independent 
impact upon poverty, we created two new variables, called double and triple crises 
(which capture the occurrence of a double and a triple crisis respectively) and we re-
examined the specification from above (the results are reported in Tables 9 and 10). 
While the results when using the double crisis variable are positive and significant across 
all specifications (albeit only contemporaneously), the results when using the triple crisis 
are rather weak in terms of significance and inconsistent in terms of sign. Moreover, their 
impact tend to decrease over time. These results should not come as a surprise. The 
number of triple crisis episodes in our sample is relatively small and in addition, crisis 
transmission mechanisms could often act in opposing way, thus driving the magnitude 
and significance of the final results. Furthermore, these results could represent an 
additional evidence for the independent impact of the different types of financial crises. 
 
Our second robustness check consists in running a difference-in-difference estimation on 
the dataset above. The results are reported in tables 11, 12 and 13. The results that we 
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obtain are consistent with our findings from above, i.e. that of the three types of crises, it 
is the currency crises which matter the most for poverty, while banking and debt crises 
tend to be mute in most cases (our banking crisis variable does appear positive and 
significant when using poverty gap at 1.25 USD a day as a dependent variable)xii.  
 
Finally, in order to see whether our findings would differ if conducted on separate sub-
samples (based on level of income or geographical area) we conducted the same analysis 
as above but on separate sub-groups of countries (divided on low, lower middle and 
upper middle income countries and on Europe Central Asia, Latin America, Middle East 
North Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia and Africa), while also testing for the 
equality of coefficients across different income and geographical groups. Our analysis 
strongly confirmed the intuition that the impact of different financial crises is consistent 
across countries. The same analysis provided further evidence for the poolability of the 
series.   
    
6. Conclusion and directions for further research  
 
The current financial crisis, which has slowly evolved into a global economic crisis, has 
rekindled interest among social scientists for re-examining the link between financial 
crises and poverty. In this paper, we empirically analyze this relationship by using a panel 
dataset for 90 developing countries across the world. By using a newly created dataset 
which contains data on financial crises (disaggregated into banking, currency and debt) 
and by employing fixed effects in order to deal with the unobserved heterogeneity, we 
derive several new findings. We confirm the established notion that crises are bad for the 
poor but more subtly, that the type of crisis matters. In particular, we observe that 
currency crises are associated with higher levels of both the poverty headcount ratio and 
the poverty gap (measured both at 1.25 USD and 2 USD a day). In addition we find that 
banking crises are associated with higher values only for the depth of poverty (rather than 
the incidence of poverty) and when they are significant in our specifications they tend to 
be ephemeral in nature. Finally, we find no direct relationship between debt crises and 
poverty.  
 
There is however a caveat that we attach to our findings. While there is internationally 
comparable data on poverty, poverty is an individual experience, so using this kind of 
data would be the best way forward in analyzing the impact of any variable on poverty. 
Notwithstanding this deficiency of our data, there are many useful things that could be 
drawn from a cross-country study that examines the impact of financial crises on poverty. 
By purging the country-specific effects, we could arrive at a few generalizations that, 
coupled with individual case studies, could shed further light onto the issue of financial 
crises and poverty. 
 
Finally, in case data permits it, we advise introducing an auto-regressive term into our 
model, which would shed further light onto the medium- and long-term impact of 
financial crises on poverty. Indeed, crises come and go and poverty levels increase and 
decrease over time. However, a necessary policy solution should be found in case 
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recurrent financial crises over longer periods of time significantly impede the process of 
poverty alleviation.    
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Banking crisis 2.11 (1.40) 1.93 (1.44) 1.85 (1.43) 1.85 (1.47)
Banking crisis (lagged)   -1.13 (1.32)   -1.71 (1.42)   -1.10 (1.32)   -1.79 (1.82)
Banking crisis (second lag)   -0.43 (0.93)   -0.67 (1.10)   -0.33 (0.93)   -0.74 (1.09)
Currency crisis 4.44* (2.29) 4.56** (2.31) 4.22* (2.40) 4.39* (2.45)
Currency crisis (lagged) 2.07 (1.49) 2.29 (1.50) 1.98 (1.50) 2.19 (1.53)
Currency crisis (second lag)   -0.66 (1.28)   -0.050 (1.32)   -0.74 (1.32)   -0.64 (1.35)
Debt crisis 4.56 (3.46) 4.08 (3.61) 2.58 (3.18) 2.02 (3.64)
Debt crisis (lagged) 0.67 (2.10) 1.32 (2.16)   -0.025 (2.46) 0.77 (2.46)
Debt crisis (second lag) 0.53 (2.17) 0.73 (2.26) 1.15 (2.23) 1.39 (2.33)
Openness   -0.039* (0.022)   -0.045** (0.022)   -0.043* (0.022)   -0.045** (0.022)   -0.042* (0.022)   -0.047** (0.022)   -0.046** (0.022)
Polity IV   -0.031 (0.023)   -0.030 (0.021)   -0.023 (0.025)   -0.032 (0.023)   -0.030 (0.023)   -0.029 (0.023)   -0.032 (0.023)
Log of GDP per capita   -15.77*** (2.43)   -14.58*** (2.57)   -15.30*** (2.45)   -14.57*** (2.57)   -15.64*** (2.43)   -14.55*** (2.57)   -14.89*** (2.58)
Government expenditure   -0.068 (0.15)   -0.045 (0.14)   -0.063 (0.15)   -0.038 (0.15)   -0.068 (0.15)   -0.047 (0.14)   -0.039 (0.14)
Inflation   0.032 (1.02)   -0.45 (0.94) 0.048 (0.96)   -0.048 (1.00) 0.018 (1.02)   -0.44 (0.94)   -0.49 (1.14)
Number of observations 417 417 417 417 417 417 417
Number of groups 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Table 5 - Fixed effects regression results while using Poverty Headcount ratio at 1.25 USD a day
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance 
respectively 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Banking crisis 2.21* (1.17) 2.12* (1.17) 2.13* (1.19) 2.14* (1.17)
Banking crisis (lagged)    -0.947 (0.66)   -1.30* (0.75)   -1.11 (0.71)   -1.41* (0.81)
Banking crisis (second lag)   -0.352  (0.45)   -0.59 (0.54)   -0.33 (0.47)  -0.61 (0.54)
Currency crisis 2.79* (1.47) 2.88* (1.49) 2.74* (1.55) 2.86* (1.56)
Currency crisis (lagged) 1.32 (1.041) 1.49 (1.049) 1.29 (1.06) 1.47 (1.07)
Currency crisis (second lag)   -0.0166 (0.789) 0.15 (0.82)   -0.017 (0.83) 0.09 (0.85)
Debt crisis 1.83 (1.63) 1.31 (1.83) 0.61 (1.50)   -0.001 (1.74)
Debt crisis (lagged) 0.55 (0.886) 1.13 (0.91) 0.037 (1.19) 0.69 (1.14)
Debt crisis (second lag)   -0.149 (0.830) 0.056 (0.86) 0.085 (0.89) 0.32 (0.93)
Openness    -0.0279 (0.0139)   -0.0321** (0.014)   -0.030** (0.014)   -0.031** (0.014)   -0.030* (0.014)   -0.032** (0.015)   -0.032** (0.014)
Polity IV   -0.018 (.0015)    -0.015 (0.015)   -0.014 (0.015)   -0.018 (0.016)   -0.016 (0.015)   -0.015 (0.016)   -0.017 (0.015)
Log of GDP per capita    -5.297*** (1.460)   -4.397*** (1.555)   -4.896*** (1.516)   -4.65*** (1.55)   -5.17*** (1.48)   -4.39*** (1.62)   -4.64*** (1.57)
Government expenditure 0.0860 (0.112) 0.099 (0.106) 0.0875 (0.109) 0.10 (0.11) 0.087 (0.114) 0.09 (0.10) 0.10 (0.11)
Inflation 0.703 (0.289) 0.426 (0.586) 0.776 (0.649) 0.36 (0.69) 0.71 (0.67) 0.42 (0.59) 0.36 (0.61)
Number of observations 417 417 417 417 417 417 417
Number of groups 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Table 6 - Fixed effects regression results while using Poverty Gap at 1.25 USD a day as a dependent variable
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance 
respectively 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Banking crisis 1.81 (1.47) 1.55 (1.48) 1.48 (1.50) 1.38 (1.53)
Banking crisis (lagged)   -0.31 (1.47)   -1.11 (1.55)   -0.64 (1.52)   -1.34 (1.67)
Banking crisis (second lag) 0.29 (1.66)   -0.012 (1.87) 0.18 (1.69)   -0.18 (1.87)
Currency crisis 4.30* (2.61) 4.36* (2.63) 3.90 (2.73) 3.99 (2.75)
Currency crisis (lagged) 3.36** (1.67) 3.73** (1.72) 3.37** (1.73) 3.50** (1.77)
Currency crisis (second lag)   -1.43 (1.78)   -1.36 (1.71)   -1.76 (1.74)   -1.72 (1.76)
Debt crisis 6.96 (4.52) 6.63 (4.67) 4.77 (4.27) 4.37 (4.40)
Debt crisis (lagged) 2.25 (3.30) 2.60 (3.50) 1.53 (3.55) 2.15 (3.73)
Debt crisis (second lag) 2.31 (2.94) 2.36 (3.06) 3.21 (3.19) 3.32 (3.30)
Openness   -0.038 (0.025)   -0.049* (0.025)   -0.044* (0.025)   -0.048* (0.025)   -0.044* (0.025)   -0.051** (0.025)   -0.051** (0.025)
Polity IV   -0.018 (0.022)   -0.020 (0.021)   -0.010 (0.021)   -0.023 (0.021)   -0.012 (0.022)   -0.016 (0.021)   -0.019 (0.021)
Log of GDP per capita   -21.87*** (2.52)   -20.37*** (2.62)   -21.45*** (2.53)   -20.58*** (2.63)   -21.61*** (2.53)   -20.42*** (2.61)   -20.61*** (2.63)
Government expenditure   -0.28* (0.16)   -0.24 (0.16)   -0.26 (0.16)   -0.024* (.0.16)   -0.26* (0.16)   -0.23 (0.16)   -0.23 (0.17)
Inflation   -0.67 (0.89)    1.22(0.92)   -0.66 (0.92)   -1.27 (0.99)   -0.73 (0.98)   -1.27 (0.93)   -1.29 (0.99)
Number of observations 417 417 417 417 417 417 417
Number of groups 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance 
respectively 
Table 7 - Fixed effects regression results while using Poverty headcount ratio at 2 USD a day
 
 
 20
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Banking crisis 2.05* (1.12) 1.91* (1.12) 1.90* (1.14) 1.87 (1.14)
Banking crisis (lagged)   -0.82 (0.90)   -1.31 (0.99)   -1.020 (0.96)   -1.44 (1.87)
Banking crisis (second lag)   -0.23 (0.70)   -0.48 (0.91)   -0.24 (0.71)   -0.54 (0.81)
Currency crisis 3.39* (1.75) 3.47** (1.76) 3.24* (1.85) 3.36* (1.85)
Currency crisis (lagged) 1.90* (1.14) 2.07* (1.15) 1.82 (1.17) 1.99* (1.18)
Currency crisis (second lag)   -0.44 (0.98)   -0.30 (1.01)   -0.52 (1.011)   -0.43 (1.03)
Debt crisis 3.29 (2.54) 2.83 (2.69) 1.74 (2.31) 1.19 (2.47)
Debt crisis (lagged) 0.97 (1.49) 1.50 (1.58) 0.39 (1.77) 1.05 (1.79)
Debt crisis (second lag) 0.42 (1.45) 0.59 (1.52) 0.87 (1.53) 1.07 (1.60)
Openness   -0.032***(0.016)   -0.038** (0.016)   -0.036** (0.017)   -0.038** (0.016)   -0.036** (0.016)   -0.039** (0.017)   -0.039** (0.017)
Polity IV   -0.020 (0.016)   -0.012 (0.017)   -0.015 (0.016)   -0.022 (0.017)   -0.017 (0.016)   -0.018 (0.016)   -0.020 (0.016)
Log of GDP per capita   -10.75*** (1.70)   -9.69*** (1.83)   -10.33*** (1.74)   -9.94*** (1.80)   -10.59*** (1.72)   -9.75*** (1.80)   -9.94*** (1.82)
Government expenditure   -0.0.17 (0.12) 0.006 (0.11)   -0.007 (0.11) 0.008 (0.11)   -0.007 (0.12) 0.008 (0.11) 0.016 (0.12)
Inflation 0.30 (0.73)   -0.068 (0.67) 0.35 (0.70)   -0.12 (0.70) 0.29 (0.74)   -0.081 (0.67)   -0.12 (0.71)
Number of observations 417 417 417 417 417 417 417
Number of groups 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Table 8 - Fixed effects regression results while using Poverty Gap at 2 USD a day
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance 
respectively  
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Model 1 - Absolute poverty gap Model 2 - Absolute Poverty ratio Model 3 - Relative Poverty Gap Model 4 - Relative Poverty Ratio
Double crisis 5.89*** (.507) 12.707*** (.739) 9.539*** (.552) 18.443*** (.750)
Double crisis (lagged)    -1.178 (1.169)  -1.891 (3.056)  -1.419 (2.333)   -1.714 (4.747)
Double crisis (second lag)   .772  (1.160) 3.095 (2.344) 1.624 (2.144)   2.779 (6.180)
Openness    -0.029** (0.014)    -0.042* (0.022)    -0.035** (0.016)    -0.042* (0.024)
Polity IV   -0.014 (.0015)   -0.026 (.0023)   -0.017 (.0016)   -0.015 (.0021)
Log of GDP per capita    -4.91*** (1.505)    -15.199*** (2.460)    -10.313*** (1.737)    -21.330*** (2.525)
Government expenditure 0.083 (0.108)  -0.068 (0.150)  -0.015 (0.117)  -0.286* (0.162)
Inflation 0.792 (0.652) 0.079 (0.973) 0.381 (0.711)  -0.580 (0.928)
Constant 49.125*** (12.168) 149.899*** (20.182) 102.855*** (14.193) 49.125*** (12.168)
Number of observations 417 417 417 417
Number of groups 90 90 90 90
Model 1 - Absolute poverty gap Model 2 - Absolute Poverty ratio Model 3 - Relative Poverty Gap Model 4 - Relative Poverty Ratio
Tripple crisis .667 (1.012) 3.554 (2.195) 2.226 (1.484) 5.218* (3.043)
Tripple crisis (lagged)    -1.177* (.615)  -3.472*** (1.282)  -.952 (.717)   2.032 (1.575)
Triple crisis (second lag)   .562  (.754) 3.44** (1.551) 2.143** (1.076)   5.495* (2.165)
Openness    -0.028** (0.014)    -0.037* (0.022)    -0.032** (0.016)    -0.037 (0.025)
Polity IV   -0.015 (.0015)   -0.027 (.0023)   -0.017 (.0016)   -0.015 (.0021)
Log of GDP per capita    -5.099*** (1.539)    -15.867*** (2.487)    -10.690*** (1.771)    -22.012*** (2.567)
Government expenditure 0.083 (0.108)  -0.075 (0.151)  -0.016 (0.118)  -0.283* (0.163)
Inflation 0.761 (0.660)  -0.020 (0.984) 0.316 (0.719)  -0.707 (0.942)
Constant 50.581*** (12.475) 155.237*** (20.411) 105.824*** (14.473) 222.487*** (21.251)
Number of observations 417 417 417 417
Number of groups 90 90 90 90
Table 9 - Fixed effects regression results while using double crisis as an independent variable
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance respectively 
Table 10 - Fixed effects regression results while using tripple crisis as an independent variable
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance respectively 
 
 
 22
Model 1 - Absolute poverty gap Model 2 - Absolute Poverty ratio Model 3 - Relative Poverty Gap Model 4 - Relative Poverty Ratio
Joint variable (treatment group and post-effect)  -1.792 (1.138)  -1.435 (1.770)  -1.121 (1.328)  .580 (1.722)
Banking crisis    2.31* (1.37)    1.950 (1.605)    1.997 (1.368)    1.346 (1.837)
Treatment group    -2.649  (3.582)    -10.164  (8.491)    -7.241  (5.981)    -17.891*  (9.851)
Constant 12.803*** (3.582) 34.623*** (7.992) 25.201*** (5.569) 55.384 (9.267)
Number of observations 479 477 477 479
Number of groups 97 97 97 97
Model 1 - Absolute poverty gap Model 2 - Absolute Poverty ratio Model 3 - Relative Poverty Gap Model 4 - Relative Poverty Ratio
Joint variable (treatment group and post-effect)  1.996* (1.029)  4.332*** (1.601)  3.482*** (1.202)  7.067*** (1.864)
Currency crisis    4.258*** (1.538)    7.842*** (2.451)    5.711*** (1.814)    7.981*** (2.535)
Treatment group    4.817  (3.229)    11.216  (6.996)    9.028*  (4.903)    18.954**  (8.325)
Constant 6.246** (2.775) 16.287** (6.307) 11.238** (4.354) 24.169** (7.550)
Number of observations 479 477 477 479
Number of groups 97 97 97 97
Model 1 - Absolute poverty gap Model 2 - Absolute Poverty ratio Model 3 - Relative Poverty Gap Model 4 - Relative Poverty Ratio
Joint variable (treatment group and post-effect)  .693 (.943)  2.262 (2.336)  1.932 (1.646)  4.834 (3.450)
Debt crisis    1.854 (1.660)    4.703 (3.55)    3.284 (2.625)    6.438 (4.892)
Treatment group    -.279  (2.998)    -3.985  (5.611)    -2.493  (4.168)     -7.901  (6.576)
Constant 10.833*** (2.023) 28.457*** (4.126) 20.657 (2.977) 45.012 (5.132)
Number of observations 479 477 477 479
Number of groups 97 97 97 97
Table 13. Difference in difference estimator for debt crises
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance respectively 
Table 11. Difference in difference estimator for banking crises
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance respectively 
Table 12. Difference in difference estimator for currency crises
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent level of significance respectively 
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i Although Checcetti et al (2009) do make distinction between the three different types of financial crises, 
they give the biggest weight to the banking crises and treat the other two only as an auxiliary to the banking 
crises.  
ii In relative terms however, this will depend on the level of the initial inequality as well as whether there 
are growth induced distributional changes.  
iii If we were to believe that the impact of financial crises on levels of poverty goes only through economic 
activity, then it would have sufficed to analyze the impact of financial crises on economic activity only and 
infer from that the indirect effect of financial crises on poverty.  
iv It is important to note that a debt crisis occurring on its own (not coupled with a currency crisis – Latin 
American style) is fundamentally different than a combination of a debt and a currency crisis. In our dataset 
described below more than half of the debt crisis episodes belong to the former category. In any case, we 
explore both hypotheses (independent debt crisis and a twin crisis in our empirical section).  
v Further description of the poverty data (including a note on the shortfalls of using aggregate poverty data) 
is featured in Appendix 1.  
vi In building the model, we employ a gradual approach, i.e. we start with a Ravallion-like simple 
relationship between poverty and GDP per capita and slowly introduce the other variables. 
vii In order to control for the additional channel of crisis transmission (slowdown in economic activity) we 
also experiment with using changes in per capita GDP (PPP), while also controlling for GDP per capita 
levels. We however find that the changes in GDP per capita are insignificant.  
viii A more detailed description of the control variables (including the sources of data and data availability) 
is presented in Appendix 2. It is also worth to point out that we had considered including levels of 
unemployment and remittances as independent variables (which though decimate the dataset due to data 
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unavailability). We have also controlled for the level of financial sector development (credit to the private 
sector in percent of GDP), however, the variable appears insignificant. 
ix We also experimented with controlling for the level of inequality (in order to examine whether countries 
with lower levels of inequality tend to weather the financial crisis better, vis-à-vis their poverty indicators) 
however the results were not robust. 
x We also explore the impact of including third, fourth and fifth lag of the crisis variables, however, these 
appear insignificant across all of our specifications. 
xi It is also worth to mention that in addition to these specifications, we also introduce an interactive term 
between GDP per capita (PPP) and the crises variables. The variable however appears insignificant (the 
same could be concluded by post-estimation testing of a linear combination between the two variables). 
xii In addition, we conducted a robustness check which consisted in running system GMM (while also 
including lagged dependent variable as a regressor). The obtained results however were weak, mainly 
driven by the unavailability of poverty data. In addition the specification did not pass the Hansen test (basic 
diagnostic test in using system GMM). 
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Appendix 1 – Detailed description of the data 
 
Poverty headcount ratio 
 
The poverty headcount ratio is the proportion of the national population whose incomes 
are below the official threshold (or thresholds) set by the national government. National 
poverty lines are usually set for households of various compositions to allow for different 
family sizes. Where there are no official poverty lines, they may be defined as the level of 
income required to have only sufficient food or food plus other necessities for survival. 
Here we use two measures for the poverty headcount ratio as defined by the World 
Development Indicators – poverty headcount ratio at 1.25 USD (characterized broadly as 
‘absolute’ poverty) a day and poverty headcount ratio at 2 USD a day (characterized 
broadly as ‘relative’ poverty). 
 
Poverty gap 
 
The poverty gap is the mean shortfall of the total population from the poverty line 
(counting the non-poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the poverty 
line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its incidence. According to the 
World Bank, the indicator is often described as measuring the per capita amount of 
resources needed to eliminate poverty, or reduce the poor’s shortfall from the poverty line 
to zero, through perfectly targeted cash transfers. In the WDI database, data reported with 
a value of 0.5 signify a poverty gap of less than 0.5 percent. 
 
Banking crises 
 
In Laeven and Valencia (2008)’s view, in a systemic banking crisis, a country’s corporate 
and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and financial institutions and 
corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. As a result, non-
performing loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking system capital 
is exhausted. This situation may be accompanied by depressed asset prices (such as 
equity and real estate prices) on the heels of run-ups before the crisis, sharp increases in 
real interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in capital flows. In some cases, the crisis is 
triggered by depositor runs on banks, though in most cases it is a general realization that 
systemically important financial institutions are in distress. Using this broad definition of 
a systemic banking crisis that combines quantitative data with some subjective 
assessment of the situation, they identify the starting year of systemic banking crises 
around the world since the year 1970. Unlike prior work (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996, 
and Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera, 2005), they exclude banking system 
distress events that affected isolated banks but were not systemic in nature. As a cross-
check on the timing of each crisis, they examine whether the crisis year coincides with 
deposit runs, the introduction of a deposit freeze or blanket guarantee, or extensive 
liquidity support or bank interventions. This way they were able to confirm about two-
thirds of the crisis dates. Alternatively, they require that it becomes apparent that the 
banking system has a large proportion of non-performing loans and that most of its 
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capital has been exhausted. This additional requirement applies to the remainder of crisis 
dates. In sum, they identify 124 systemic banking crises over the period 1970 to 2007. 
This list is an updated, corrected, and expanded version of the Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996) and Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera (2005) banking crisis databases.  
 
Given that they do not identify the length of most of the crises, when we code the 
banking crisis variable, we assume value 1 for the beginning year of the crisis and 0 for 
all other years. In sum, we use 96 banking crises that occurred across the developing 
world from 1970 until 2007. 
 
Currency crises 
 
Building on the approach in Frankel and Rose (1996), Laeven and Valencia (2008) define 
a “currency crisis” as a nominal depreciation of the currency of at least 30 percent that is 
also at least a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation compared to the year before. 
In terms of measurement of the exchange rate depreciation, they use the percent change 
of the end-of-period official nominal bilateral dollar exchange rate from the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) database of the IMF. For countries that meet the criteria for 
several continuous years, they use the first year of each 5-year window to identify the 
crisis. This definition yields 208 currency crises during the period 1970-2007. It should 
be noted that this list also includes large devaluations by countries that adopt fixed 
exchange rate regimes. As in the previous case, the currency crisis variable is a dummy 
variable which takes values 1 for the beginning year of the crisis and 0 otherwise. Of the 
208 currency crises that they identify, we use 147 currency crises that occurred across the 
developing countries from 1970 until 2007.  
 
Sovereign Debt crises 
 
Finally, Laeven and Valencia (2008) identify and date episodes of sovereign debt default 
and restructuring by relying on information from Beim and Calomiris (2001), World 
Bank (2002), Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006), and IMF Staff reports. The 
information compiled includes year of sovereign defaults to private lending and year of 
debt rescheduling. Using this approach, they identify 63 episodes of sovereign debt 
defaults and restructurings since 1970. Again, as in the previous two cases, the sovereign 
debt crisis variable takes values 1 for the beginning year of the crisis and 0 otherwise. 
Out of the 63 identified sovereign debt crises, we use 52 that struck the developing 
countries in the period from 1970 until 2007.  
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Appendix 2 – Description of the control variables 
 
Growth and development 
 
While the debate on pro-poor or anti-poor growth is not over yet (see for example 
Ravallion and Chen (2001)), there is a burgeoning literature which suggests that poverty 
decreases with the level of economic development. The incidence of absolute poverty in 
developing countries tends to fall with growth. (for a survey of the literature see Bruno et 
al. (1998)).  
 
Trade openness 
 
Dollar and Kraay (2001) revisit the relationship between openness and growth and 
openness and poverty. They conclude that globalization leads to faster growth and 
poverty reduction in poor countries. In the same token Dollar (2001) argues that the only 
developing countries that have registered significant declines in poverty are the ones that 
have integrated faster into the world economy on the dimensions of trade and investment. 
It is important to note though that this strand of literature has also had many critics (for 
example Bardhan (2005), Ravallion (2005), Berg and Kureger (2002), and Cashin et al 
(2001)), whose consensus is that there is no direct systematic link between trade openness 
and poverty but that this relationship is indirect and operates through the effect of growth.   
 
Institutional development and democracy 
 
The existing evidence on the impact of democracy on poverty is mixed. A group of 
authors find that democracies are conducive to poverty alleviation: Sen (1981, 1999), 
Moon and Dixon (1985), Dasgupta (1993), Boone (1992), Przeworski et al. (2000), 
Bueno de Mesquita and Root (2000), McGuire (2001), Siegle, Weinstein and Halperin 
(2004). Most of these papers have argued that democracies improve the conditions of the 
poor along three lines: democracies empower poor people through elections and hence 
force governments to attend to their needs; there is free flow of information in 
democracies which keeps governments informed about the conditions of the poor people 
and finally, democratic governments provide people with more public goods. On the 
other hand, Ross (2005) claims that democracy does not have any direct impact on the 
level of poverty.  
 
Inflation 
 
While it seems intuitive that inflation would hurt the poor proportionally more than the 
non-poor, there are not many studies that explore the impact on poverty of inflation. 
Cardoso (1992) and Easterly (2001) are the two most notable papers whose main 
message resonates the previously stated idea that inflation is bad for poverty. 
